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THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER SECTION I6(b) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 1 provides
for corporate recovery of short-swing profits' of insiders (officers,
directors or beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of any equity
security) in the equity securities of their corporations. The section
eschews all tests of manipulative intent and adopts an objective rule
whereby transactions completed by insiders within the six-month
holding period are conclusively presumed to have been motivated by
the unfair use of inside information. A civil action to recover short-
swing profits can be brought by the issuers corporation or by any
security holder of the corporation if his request to the issuer to bring
such an action is not satisfied within sixty days. In the latter situation
the action must be maintained on behalf of the issuer corporation and
any recovery inures to the issuer corporation.
A difficult and recurring problem in the administration of section
16(b) is the interpretation of the word "director." Although directors
of corporations are usually individuals representing their own interests,
situations often arise where a corporation or partnership, owning
substantial holdings in an issuer corporation, elects a person to repre-
sent its interests on the issuer corporation's board of directors. In this
situation the question arises whether the corporation or partnership
can be considered a director for the purposes of section 16(b) liability.
Another problem is whether a corporation should be considered a
director within the meaning of section 16(b) merely because one of
1 Section 16(b) states:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in
behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter;
but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any trans-
action where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as
not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
2 "Short-swing profits" are profits gained in a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
of any equity security within a period of six months or less.
a For the definition of an "issuer," see 15 U.S.C. 78c(a) (8) (1964).
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its officers or directors is sitting on another corporation's board of
directors. A similar problem is presented in determining whether a
partnership should be considered a director merely because one of
its partners is sitting on a corporation's board of directors.
The purpose of this comment is to determine the present state
of the law relative to these questions by examining the language and
legislative history of section 16(b) and several cases which have in-
terpreted the section. The legal ramifications of the decisional law will
then be examined and possible judicial and regulatory solutions sug-
gested. Finally, a statutory amendment to section 16(b) will be pro-
posed which attempts to resolve these problems which, it is concluded,
the courts have failed to solve.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 16 (b)
Section 16(b) provides that
any profit realized by [a director] from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer . . . within any period of less than six months .. .
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . . 4
Section 3(a) (7) of the Act defines a "director" as "any director of
a corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect
to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated."' (Em-
phasis added.) Section 3(a) (9) states that a corporation or partner-
ship can be considered a "person."' Thus, it is possible that for
purposes of section 16(b) liability a director can be either a corpora-
tion7 or a partnership.' However, section 16(b) does not enumerate
the particular circumstances in which corporations or partnerships
will be considered directors. Thus it is necessary to examine the legisla-
tive history of the section to ascertain the extent and nature of con-
gressional consideration of this question.
The purpose of section 16(b) is to curtail the use for purposes of
stock manipulation of confidential information gained by a corporate
officer or director by virtue of his position within a corporation.' The
House and Senate hearings indicate that there was a strong feeling in
Congress that the prevailing change in corporate structure from the
closely-held company to the large, publicly-owned company had given
too much freedom to corporate insiders in the exercise of their fiduciary
duties.'" This freedom it was believed, had been misused by these
fiduciaries and, as a result, confidence in the stockmarket had been
greatly weakened. In order to strengthen this confidence and to protect
4 See note 1 supra.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78c(7) (1964).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78c(9) (1964).
7 Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937, 941-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409 (1962).
9 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1041 (2d ed. 1961) ; see also S. Rep. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
10 See H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934).
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the public against flagrant abuse of the corporate insider's position, it
was deemed necessary to enact legislation which would control the
extent to which insiders could purchase and sell stock of their corpora-
tions?'
Congress therefore determined that section 16(b) should operate
automatically in regard to the existence of liability.' 2 Liability was not
made to depend upon the propriety of the use of inside information or
the existence of fraud. Any corporate insider making a profit on a
short-swing transaction is required to return his profit to the issuer
corporation regardless of whether he had access to inside information
or made the sale on the basis of such information?'
Although Congress intended section 16(b) to operate automati-
cally in determining the existence of a violation, it is unclear whether
it intended the persons subject to liability to be determined ac-
cording to an objective test, and if so, whether such a test auto-
matically includes or excludes partnerships and corporations. Congress
deleted a section of the Securities Exchange Bill which would have
made liable "any person" using inside information received from a
director to make a profit in a short-swing transaction." This provision
was never enacted because of the expected difficulties in administering
it?' It has been argued that the rejection of this section indicates
Congress intentionally omitted any provision dealing with the liability
of partnerships?' and that this omission manifests the intent of Con-
11 S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
12 Hearings on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 56 and S. 97, Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
13 See Smoiowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1943).
14 This section provided in part:
(b) It shalt be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities,
owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per cent of any class of
stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered on a national securities
exchange—
(3) To disclose, directly or indirectly, any confidential information regard-
ing or affecting any such registered security not necessary or proper to be
disclosed as part of his corporate duties. Any profit made by any person,
to whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any
transaction or transactions in such registered security within a period not
exceeding six months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer unless such person shall have had no reasonable ground to
believe that the disclosure was confidential or was made not in the per-
formance of corporate duties. . • .
S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
15 See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 412 n.12 (1962).
16 See Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1952).
Although this argument has not been made in any of the cases with respect to the
liability of corporations under § 16(b), there is no logical reason why the argument could
not have been made. The first case to consider corporate liability, Marquette Cement
Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), was decided three years after
the Supreme Court decided Blau v. Lehman. The Court recognized in that case that a
corporation could, under the proper circumstances, be considered a "director" within the
meaning of § 16(b). Thus, after Blau it was conceded by most authorities that partner-
ships and corporations were not exempted from § 16(b) liability. But see Brief for Ap-
pellee at 15, Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
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gress that a partnership not be considered a "director" within the
meaning of section 16(b). However, the assumptions underlying this
position are of doubtful validity. For example, the transmission of
inside information from a director-partner to a partnership is not a
prerequisite for ,partnership liability under section 16(b), just as the
transfer of inside information from a director-insider to a corporation
is not necessary for corporate liability under 16(b). To assume neces-
sity of transfer contradicts the very nature of 16(b) liability, which
is that knowledge or use of inside information is irrelevant in deter-
mining liability.
A more reasonable explanation is that the deleted section was not
a definition of the term "director"; it was an attempt to create another
class of individuals ("tippees") who would also be subject to liability
for engaging in short-swing transactions. It is submitted therefore that
the deletion of this section manifests no congressional intent to limit
the definition of the term.
 "director."
II. THE CASES UNDER SECTION 16(b)
A. The Rattner Case
The first case to consider the liability of a partnership under
section 16(b) was Rattner v. Lehman. 1- 7
 Lehman Brothers (Lehman),
an investment banking and securities partnership, purchased and sold
in a short-swing transaction 5000 shares of Consolidated Vultee Cor-
poration (Vultee) stock at a time when one of Lehman's partners,
Hertz, was serving on the board of directors of Vultee. Lehman real-
ized approximately $15,000 in profit on the transaction, but failed to
tender its profit to Vultee.' A stockholder of Vultee brought an action
on behalf of Vultee to recover the profits which Lehman had made on
the transaction. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Lehman's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.'
The court of appeals affirmed basing its holding upon the fact that
section 16(b) does not expressly provide for an accounting of profits
realized by partners of a director.' It is submitted that the result
reached in Rattner is correct, although the court's reasoning is faulty.
The pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties in the district
court failed to show that Hertz was deputed by Lehman to represent
its interests on the Vultee board of directors. The parties also stip-
ulated that Lehman's transactions in Vultee stock were made without
Hertz's knowledge or acquiescence. There were no allegations by the
plaintiff that Hertz had imparted any information regarding Vultee
to his fellow Lehman partners.
17 98 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
18 Upon being informed of the transaction, Hertz, however, turned over his share
of the partnership profits, $806.62, to Vultee. 98 F. Supp. at 1010.
19
 Id. at 1011. Lehman's motion to dismiss the complaint was brought under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6).
20 193 F.2d at 566.
275
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The court of appeals also asserted that the legislative history of
the statute clearly indicated that the omission of any provision dealing
with the liability of a partnership was intentional." This argument
was also articulated in the district court, in which it was pointed out
that earlier drafts of the statute, unlike section 16(b), made liable
"any person" who made a profit in the issuer corporation's stock
within six months after the disclosure of inside information by an
insider of the issuer corporation.22 Lack of a similar provision in sec-
tion 16(b) was interpreted as indicating the intent of Congress to
specifically exclude partnerships from the Act.'
In Rattner Judge Learned Hand concurred in the result, but ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the majority opinion, and
indicated that he wished
to say nothing as to whether, if a firm deputed a partner
to represent its interests as a director on the board, the other
partners would not be liable. True, they would not even then
be formally "directors"; but I am not prepared to say that
they could not be so considered; for some purposes the com-
mon law does treat a firm as a jural person.'
This statement by Judge Hand was the first acknowledgement that a
partnership entity could be considered a director for the purposes of
section 16(b).
B. The Blau Case
In Blau v. Lehman" the plaintiff, a stockholder of Tide Water
Associated Oil Company (Tide Water), brought an action against
Lehman Brothers (Lehman)" and Joseph A. Thomas, a partner
of Lehman and a director of Tide Water. Lehman purchased and sold
at a profit 50,000 shares of Tide Water within a six month period
while Thomas was sitting on the Tide Water board of directors. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York, after trial,
dismissed the complaint against Lehman and asserted:
The law is now well settled that the mere fact that a partner
in Lehman Brothers was a director of Tide Water, at the time
that Lehman Brothers had this short swing transaction in
the stock of Tide Water, is not sufficient to make the partner-
ship liable for the profits thereon
The district court found that the Tide Water stock was bought
and sold without the advice, concurrence, or knowledge of Thomas.
21 Id.
22 98 F. Supp. at 1010.
23 Id.; see p. 274 supra.
24 193 F.2d at 567.
25 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 368
U.S. 403 (1962).
26 It should be noted that this is the same Lehman Brothers as in the Rattner case.
27 173 F. Supp. at 593.
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The court also found that Lehman dealt in the Tide Water stock on
the basis of public announcements by Tide Water and not on the basis
of inside information from Thomas. Finally, the court found that
Thomas' invitation to join the Tide Water board of directors was
upon the initiative of Tide Water, not Lehman.
Although the court in Blau impliedly accepted the validity of the
deputization theory, which was first articulated by Judge Hand in
Rattner, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Blau impliedly re-
jected this theory. While affirming the decision of the district court, the
majority stated:
We do not agree with this [deputization theory], as we
must take section 16(b) as we find it, and we do not see how
any sort of deputizing can make the partners or the partner-
ship a "director" within the meaning of Section 16(b).28
The court of appeals then claimed that the validity of the dep-
utization theory was not at issue since the district court found no
evidence that Lehman deputed Thomas to represent its interests on
the Tide Water board of directors. 29
The reasoning of the majority opinion in the court of appeals in
Blau is subject to the same criticism as the reasoning of the district
court and court of appeals in Rattner. The .Blau court adopted the
Rattner approach by relying heavily upon the fact that Congress
deleted a section of the statute which would have made liable persons
receiving inside information from a director. As stated earlier, the
failure of Congress to enact this section is weak authority for the
proposition that Congress intended to exempt partnerships from sec-
tion 16 (b) liability." The Blau court felt that the Rattner decision was
binding, "especially since it has been in force for some eight years
and the Congress has not seen fit to amend the statute . . . ."" This
reasoning is particularly disturbing in that it implies that congres-
sional inaction necessarily indicates congressional acquiesence."
Judge Clark, dissenting-in Blau, suggested that Rattner should be
overruled or at least reexamined.' He based his argument primarily
upon a literal reading of the statute. He asserted that under New York
partnership law, Thomas was co-owner . with the other Lehman part-
ners of the Tide Water stock, and that Lehman would be charged with
the knowledge acquired by Thomas in performing his duties as a
director with Tide Water." This, he concluded, was sufficient to bririg
the Lehman transaction within the operation of the statute. It is
questionable, however, whether the mere co-ownership of stock, com-
28 286 F.2d at 789.
29 Id.
30 See pp. 274-75 supra.
31 286 F.2d at 789.
92 See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
33 286 F.2d at 794.
34 Judge Clark referred specifically to N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 12, 23, 40, 43, 50-52
(McKinney 1948).
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bined with the legal fiction that a partnership has constructive notice
of its partners' dealings, should make a partnership a director and,
hence, liable under section 16(b). New York partnership law does not
state that a partnership is to be considered a director whenever one of
its partners is a director. Furthermore, New York does not impute
the knowledge of a single partner to the rest of the partners unless the
matter relates to the partnership's affairs." Thus, Thomas' knowledge
of Tide Water's activities could be imputed to Lehman only if Thomas
were acting on behalf of Lehman. Since the district court found that
Thomas was not representing Lehman on the Tide Water board of
directors, Thomas' knowledge could not, therefore, be imputed to
Lehman.
Judge Clark also argued that the legislative history of section
16(b) indicated that the objective standard used to determine liability
should also be used to ascertain the persons subject to such liability."
While it is clear that section 16(b) liability attaches whenever a direc-
tor profits on a short-swing transaction in his corporation's stock, this
use of an objective standard of proof is not conclusive as to whether
Congress also wanted a partnership to be considered a director
whenever one of its partners was a director."
Although preferring the adoption of an objective standard for
determining liability, Judge Clark maintained that even the use of a
subjective standard would not exempt Lehman from liability:
Here the evidence of director-participation . . . goes so far
that it is hard to see what more the director could have done
to assist his partners short of doing the trading himself."
On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the exis-
tence of deputization was an issue of fact," and that the findings of
the district court were not "clearly erroneous.' The Supreme Court,
unlike the court of appeals, asserted that it would recognize the dep-
utization theory under the proper circumstances. The Court rejected,
however, the argument that a partnership should be considered a
director within the meaning of section 16(b) merely because one of
its partners was sitting on the board of directors of a corporation.
Justice Black writing for the majority stated that neither sections
3(a) (9) and 3(a) (7) nor the strong public policy in favor of part-
35 N.Y. Partnership Law § 23 (McKinney 1948).
8B 286 F.2d at 794.
37 Judge Clark also concluded that the exemption of a partnership from § 16(b)
liability would provide a loophole which Congress certainly would not have desired. Id.
at 795. This argument is an attack upon the statute itself and is not a sufficient reason
for the judiciary to amend the language of the statute to reach what it considers to be
an equitable result.
38 Id. Judge Clark mentioned that Thomas, in his deposition, admitted that he had
suggested to his partners that Tide Water was an "attractive investment" and that
Tide Water's new management was very impressive. Id.
39 368 U.S. at 410.
40 Id. at 408-09.
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nership liability furnished a sufficient reason to interpret section 16(b)
in such a manner.
Justice Douglas in a vigorous dissent argued that the ruling of
the majority mutilated the Securities Exchange Act." He asserted that
"the scope and degree of liability arising out of fiduciary relations"
should be strictly construed. 42 He further maintained that construing
section 16(b) narrowly defeated the legislative intent. His argument
implies that the deputization theory ignores the reality of the invest-
ment banking business, and that effectuation of congressional intent
requires the adoption of an objective standard for determining the
persons subject to section 16(b) liability.
The problem presented by Justice Douglas' approach is that it
operates under the assumption that a partner on the board of directors
of a corporation is always acting on behalf of a firm:
Everyone knows that the investment banking-corporation
alliances are consciously constructed so as to increase the
profits of the bankers."
This assumption, however, ignores other legitimate reasons why a
partner might be sitting on a board of directors. He might, for ex-
ample, have been sought by the corporation because of his financial
and business expertise. The partner might also be on the board be-
cause of his individual stock holdings in the corporation. Adoption of
the objective standard in these situations would, because of its over-
inclusiveness, produce a rather harsh result.
After the Supreme Court decided Blau v. Lehman, it was appar-
ent that the deputization theory could be utilized in the proper
circumstances. However, the Court did not enumerate under what cir-
cumstances the theory was to be applied, but simply implied that the
existence of deputization is an issue of fact to be determined on a
case by case basis. 44 Some of the factors considered by the Court were:
(1) Who sought the services of Thomas on the board of directors of
Tide Water? (2) Did Thomas provide Lehman with inside informa-
tion, and did this "cause" Lehman to purchase or sell the Tide Water
stock? and (3) Was Thomas aware of the fact that Lehman was trans-
acting business in the Tide Water stock? However, it was firmly
established in Blau that casual references to the quality and potential
of a corporation are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to establish
deputization.
C. The Feder Case
The first case giving in-depth consideration to corporate liability
under section 16(b)," as opposed to partnership liability, was Feder
41
 Id. at 415.
42 Id. at 416.
43 Id, at 415.
44 Id. at 410.
45 The first case that considered corporate liability under 116(b) was Marquette
Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). There the issuer cor-
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v. Martin Marietta Corp. 41' Plaintiff Feder was a shareholder of Sperry
Rand Corporation (Sperry). Feder brought an action under section
16(b) against Martin Marietta Corporation (Martin), alleging that
Martin was a director of Sperry for purposes of section 16(b) since
Martin's president, Bunker, was actually sitting on Sperry's board
of directors. While Bunker was a director on Sperry's board, Martin
purchased 101,300 shares of Sperry stock which it later sold within a
six-month period for a substantial profit. From the evidence presented
the District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded
that Martin was not a director of Sperry. It found that Martin had
not deputed Bunker to represent its interests on the Sperry board of
directors and that Martin, therefore, was not liable under section
16(b).47
The conclusion of the district court was based upon several fact
determinations. First, Sperry originally invited Bunker to join its
board of directors in the fall of 1962, a time when Martin held no
Sperry stock. Bunker declined, but in February, 1963, Sperry once
again extended an invitation. Bunker also rejected this invitation in
spite of the fact that Martin at that time owned more than 400,000
shares of Sperry stock. The court determined that both of these in-
vitations and rejections indicated that Bunker was not deputed by
Martin. The court concluded that if Martin intended to obtain repre-
sentation on the Sperry board, Bunker would have accepted the second
invitation. The evidence also indicated that if Bunker rejected the
Sperry directorship, no other Martin officer or director would have
been considered for the position.
The court also noted the absence of evidence that Bunker dis-
closed any inside information about Sperry to Martin's other officers
and directors. Although the passage of such inside information is not
essential to liability under section 16(b), it would be probative of the
fact that Martin deputed Bunker to represent its interests.
The court also found no affirmative action by Martin in placing
Bunker on the Sperry board of directors. While the Martin board
of directors did vote to allow Bunker to accept the Sperry director-
ship, this was done after Sperry made the offer to Bunker. Martin's
ratification was considered to be merely a procedural matter required
poration, Marquette, brought an action against one of its directors, Andreas, and the
corporation of which Andreas was a major shareholder. The defendant corporation
engaged in a profitable short-swing transaction and Marquette alleged that the defendant
corporation should be liable for such profits. Marquette claimed that the defendant
corporation had deputized Andreas to represent its interests on the Marquette hoard of
directors. The court recognized the validity of the deputization theory, but stated:
Standing alone, the fact that a stockholder in a family corporation has engaged
in a short-swing transaction from which the corporation has benefited, is in-
sufficient to show an actual deputiiation.
Id. at 967.
40 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
38 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1970).
47 286 F. Supp. at 948.
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by Martin's by laws. It appears that a director of Sperry testified that
Sperry's interest in Bunker was based on Bunker's business reputation
and financial expertise. The Sperry director also conceded that
"rumors" of Martin's acquisition of Sperry stock made Bunker an
even more desirable candidate. Sperry was apprehensive of a take-
over by another corporation and believed Bunker's presence would
add strength to the board.
The court also considered Bunker's testimony that his interest in
the Sperry appointment was based upon the corporation's interesting
operational and managerial problems. Finally, the court compared the
control exercised by Martin over Bunker with the control Martin,had
exercised over deputies sitting on other boards of directors and con-
cluded that Martin had relatively little control over Bunker's actions.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the
finding of the district court that Bunker was not deputed by Martin
to represent its interests on the Sperry board of directors was "clearly
erroneous!"98 The court of appeals relied upon six facts which were
deemed relatively unimportant by the district court. First, Bunker was
ultimately responsible for all of Martin's investments. This meant
that any stock transaction involving those investments had to receive
his approval before it was made. Therefore, no disclosure of inside
information by Bunker to Martin was necessary for such information
to be used by Martin. This fact, the court concluded, made 'irrelevant
the district court's finding that there was no evidence of inside in-
formation passing from Bunker to Martin. Second, Bunker admitted
in his letter of resignation to Sperry's board of directors, that he
represented Martin's interests while serving on the Sperry board.
Martin claimed that Bunker did this only to pacify the elderly Chair-
man of the Sperry board, who misunderstood Bunker's position on the
board. The court found this unacceptable and stated that the logical
inference of the letter was that Bunker had been representing Martin
on the Sperry board. Third, Martin's board of directors approved
Bunker's directorship with Sperry prior to Bunker's acceptance of
48 406 F.2d at 263.
Another problem considered by the court of appeals in Feder, but not reached by the
district court, related to the issue whether Martin, in order to be liable under § 16(b),
must have been a "director" throughout the period of the short-swing transaction. While
the profits sued for were from stocks purchased after Bunker became a member of
Sperry's board, they were sold approximately one month after his resignation from the
board. Martin alleged that since it was not a "director" both at the time of purchase and
the time of sale, it could not be liable under § 16(b). Martin relied upon Rule X-16A-10
of the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1968), which states that any transaction exempted
from the reporting requirements of § 16(a), is also exempt from the provisions of § 16(b).
However, the court did not agree with Martin and held:
Clearly, therefore, a "short-swing" sale or purchase by a resigning director must
be a transaction "comprehended within the purpose of" § 16(b), and to the
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the directorship, and only after discovering Martin's strong financial
position in Sperry stock. Fourth, Bunker testified that he had discussed
Sperry's "short range outlook" with other Sperry directors, and that
he had participated in meetings during which Martin's investments in
Sperry stock were discussed. Fifth, an unsigned memorandum found
in the Martin Marietta files entitled, "Notes on Exploratory Invest-
ment in Sperry Rand Corporation," was considered by the court as
an indication that Martin was benefiting from Bunker's position with
Sperry.
The final determination made by the court of appeals was that there
existed a functional similarity between Bunker's position on the
Sperry board of directors and other Martin deputies sitting on other
boards of directors. Bunker's position could only be distinguished
from the other deputies by a lesser degree of supervision and the lack
of a duty to report to Martin concerning Sperry's affairs. The court
felt that this distinction was not sufficient to indicate that Bunker had
not been deputized.
Although Feder is the first case in which a corporation was
considered a director under section 1.6(b), it appears that the decision
accords with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Blau where the
court recognized the validity of the deputization theory but did not
apply it. In Feder the court of appeals correctly applied this theory,
recognizing that Feder was factually distinguishable from Blau.
Whereas in Feder the director, Bunker, was integrally involved in the
investment policies of Martin, including the prior approval of the
purchase and sale of the Sperry stock, in Blau the director, Thomas,
did not participate in Lehman's investment decisions concerning the
Tide Water stock. Thomas was even ignorant of the fact that Lehman
anticipated a purchase of Tide Water stock. This distinction clearly
justified application of the deputization theory.
From these cases a number of generalizations can be made con-
cerning the liability of corporations and partnerships under section
16(b). The courts have rejected the use of an objective standard which
would require a corporation or partnership to disgorge to the issuer
corporation any short-swing profits whenever one of its officers, direc-
tors or partners was a director of the issuer corporation. The courts
have instead utilized a subjective standard which requires examination
of the facts in each case to determine if there has been a deputization
by the corporate or partnership entity. This approach presents severe
evidentiary problems for the plaintiff—a burden which is inconsistent
with the remedial and objective nature of section 16(b). Moreover,
although courts recognize the deputization theory, they have vet to
fully articulate the circumstances in which it will be applied. Thus a
potential plaintiff might be deterred from commencing a section 16(b)
action against a corporation or partnership because of the inability to
determine the type of evidence which must be presented,
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III. SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR ESTABLISHING
SECTION 16(b) LIABILITY
It is suggested that to alleviate the difficult evidentiary problems
of a plaintiff attempting to establish deputization, the court should
raise a rebuttable presumption that a corporation or partnership is a
director within the meaning of section 16(b) whenever one of its
officers, directors or partners holds a position on the board of directors
of an issuer corporation. The burden of persuasion should be shifted
to the corporation or partnership to establish that it did not deputize
the officer, director or partner. This procedure would lessen the burden
on the plaintiff, although it would not necessarily apprise him of the
nature or extent of the evidence which would be required if the pre-
sumption were rebutted by the corporation or partnership.
Another possible approach to the problem is for the SEC to
promulgate regulations listing a number of proscribed activities for
corporations or partnerships. These regulations should delineate situa-
tions where such corporations or partnerships would be considered
directors for purposes of section 16(b) liability. The regulations should
recognize the validity of the deputization theory and list situations in
which the theory could be automatically applied. For example, one of
the regulations might state that a corporation will be considered a
director under section 16(b) if it formally designates or approves the
apointment of one of its officers or directors to an issuer corporation's
board of directors. This approach would eliminate much of the un-
certainty which presently exists. It would have to be recognized, - how-
ever, that corporations or partnerships could still create new types of
relationships not listed in the regulations. In fact, the very uncertainty
of the application of the deputization theory might actually deter cor-
porations and partnerships from attempting to evade section 16(b)
liability. In order to prevent corporations and partnerships from
creating new relationships, the regulations should not only list a number
of situations where the theory would automatically apply, but also
state that the existence of deputization is not limited to those situa-
tions.
A final approach to the problem would be the enactment of a
legislative amendment to section 16(b) which would read as follows:
If a director, officer or employee of a corporation serves on
another corporation's board of directors, the corporation will
be considered a "director" for the purposes of this section.
If a partner of a partnership serves on a corporation's board
of directors, the partnership will be considered a "director"
for the purposes of this section.
This approach would obviate the plaintiff's necessity of establish-
ing the existence of deputization. Although this solution might lead
to harsh consequences in certain situations, it would accord with the
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philosophy which led to the enactment of section 16(b). The amend-
ment would be consistent with the original purpose of preventing mis-
use of inside information." However, enactment of such an amendment
would not completely eliminate the possibility of the misuse of inside
information. A corporation could still authorize a person, other than one
of its officers, directors or employees .to represent its 'interests on an-
other corporation's board of directors without incurring section 16(b)
liability." Therefore it still would be necessary to retain the deputiza-
tion theory to curb other abuses which would not be alleviated by the
amendment to section 16 (b) .
ROBERT A. LUSARDI
49 See note 9 supra.
50 See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 33 (Supp. 1962).
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